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W HEN AMERICAN AIRLINES introduced its SABRE
computerized reservation system (CRS) in 1976, it
began a technological revolution that would allow nearly
every travel agent to make airline reservations almost in-
stantaneously. CRS's slashed agent and airline costs
while making it much more convenient for consumers to
book airline, hotel, and rental-car reservations. The Air-
line Deregulation Act of 19781 made such a service partic-
ularly important since the Act prompted airlines to offer
an ever-changing proliferation of fares accompanied by a
variety of restrictions.
American and the other major airlines that developed
CRS systems received a less than enthusiastic response
from regulators. Because their innovation became such
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an indispensable marketing tool, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) in 1984 effectively labeled the five airline-
owned CRS's "barriers to entry" and promulgated a
plethora of rules designed to ensure that all airlines would
have fair access to each CRS.2 In March of 1991, the De-
partment of Transportation proposed additional restric-
tions in the name of consumer protection (DOT proposed
rules). Some analysts and policymakers would go even
further by forcing airlines to divest their ownership inter-
ests in CRS's. 4 Thus, the message to airlines seems to be
that innovation does not pay.
This new type of airline regulation flourished in the
Reagan and early Bush administrations, even as Depart-
ment of Transportation officials and antitrust authorities
staunchly defended airline route and rate deregulation.
While special interest group pressures no doubt explain
this policy paradox, there remains an intellectual paradox
that deserves an intellectual explanation. Simply put, how
can policymakers and economists square intense regula-
tion of a major innovation with an overall deregulatory
airline policy?
The answer lies in the economic research and theories
underlying the original airline deregulation movement.
As the Harvard Business School's Thomas McCraw notes
in his biographical chapter on economist Alfred Kahn, the
airline deregulation movement contained "a number of
strange bedfellows," including "the National Association
of Manufacturers, Common Cause, Sears Roebuck, the
American Association of Retired Persons, the Aviation
Consumer Action Project, the National Taxpayers
Union," and other diverse interests.5 A glance at some of
the relevant personalities underscores McCraw's point.
Kahn, the CAB chairman who spearheaded the Carter
2 14 C.F.R. §§ 255-256 (1991).
56 Fed. Reg. 12,586 (1991) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255) (proposed
Mar. 26, 1991) [hereinafter DOT Proposed Rules].
4 Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy,
and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 482 (1987).
• THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 268 (1984).
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administration's deregulation efforts, possessed strong
liberal Democratic credentials, as did the Senate's deregu-
lation champion, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA). Yet
strong support for deregulation also came from Elizabeth
'Bailey, 6 another economist and a Republican member of
the CAB, and two major academic critics of airline regula-
tion, James C. Miller III and George Douglas,7 both of
whom were later appointed to the Federal Trade Com-
mission by President Reagan. Airline deregulation clearly
cut across political and ideological lines.
The one point on which all of the pro-deregulation
economists, policymakers, and interest groups agreed was
that a government-enforced airline cartel was bad for the
airlines' customers and bad for the national economy.
Later confusion would arise because this view is compati-
ble with nearly all schools of thought in industrial organi-
zation. "Structure-conduct-performance" economists
tend to believe that private markets are rife with barriers
to entry, strategic behavior, and other imperfections that
government can and should correct, but these economists
would hardly recommend a government-enforced airline
cartel as the cure.8 Nor is such a cartel desirable from a
"Chicago" antitrust perspective, because in the absence
of collusion and barriers to entry, the private marketplace
can usually be counted on to approximate maximum eco-
nomic efficiency. 9 Contestable market theory, meanwhile,
suggested that even if only one or two airlines competed
on a route, potential competition would exercise a power-
ful discipline.' 0 Public choice economists questioned the
n Id. at 273.
7 See, e.g., George W. Douglas &James C. Miller III, Quality Competition, Industry
Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
657 (1974); George W. Douglas &James C. Miller III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1974).
F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(2d ed. 1980); MICHAEL WATERSON, ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE INDUSTRY (1984).
1 ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1977).
'. Elizabeth E. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy,
1992] 569
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CAB's ability to do anything except serve politically pow-
erful constituencies, to the detriment of consumers."
"Market process" economists see most all regulatory
agencies as principal barriers to entrepreneurial innova-
tion.12 About the only intellectual defenders of pre-1978
regulation would be believers in theories of "destructive
competition," but such notions have not been fashionable
in economics since the Great Depression. 13
Despite this rich variety of viewpoints on competition
and regulation, most policymakers continue to view gov-
ernment regulation of the CRS industry as necessary to
prevent anticompetitive behavior though the use of CRS's
- especially those that are owned by airlines. The princi-
pal argument for regulation is that lack of competition
permits CRS-owning airlines to bias screen displays in
ways that disadvantage competitors; hence, government
regulation is needed to prevent display bias and other
forms of discrimination. This article seeks to show that
continued government regulation of the CRS industry is
not only unnecessary, but quite likely to harm consumers.
71 AM. ECON. REV. 178 (1981). For evaluations of this hypothesis under deregula-
tion, see STEVEN A. MORRISON AND CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1986); ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, DANIEL R. GRAHAM, AND
DANIEL P. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985); Ayers, Determinants of Air-
line Carrier Conduct, 8 INT'L. J.L. & ECON. 187 (1988); Steven A. Morrison and Clif-
ford Winston, Empirical Implications and Tests of the Contestability Hypothesis, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 53-54 (1987); Thomas Gabe Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Its Effects on
Passengers, Capital, and Labor, 29 J.L. & ECON. 1-22 (1986); David R. Graham,
Daniel P. Kaplan, and David S. Sibley, Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry,
14 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 118-37 (1983).
1 George S. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 5 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCi. 22, 23 (1971).
21 On the ways in which regulation diminishes entrepreneurial innovation, see
ISRAEL KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 114-49 (1985) (provid-
ing a detailed analysis of the capitalist system and how certain systems, such as
regulation, affect it).
I., In legal literature, Paul Steven Dempsey has spent his career warning about
destructive competition under deregulation. See PAUL S. DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND:
THE FAILURE OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1990) [hereinafter DEMPSEY, FLYING
BLIND]; Paul S. Dempsey, The Empirical Results of Airline Deregulation: A Decade Later
and the Band Played On, 17 TRANSP. L.J. 31 (1988) [hereinafter Dempsey, Empirical
Results].
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THE CRS INDUSTRY
Ironically, the current structure of the computerized
reservation system (CRS) market stems in part from previ-
ous government policies. In 1967, twenty-one airlines
agreed jointly to develop a CRS system that would be
shared by the entire industry. Antitrust officials, however,
hinted that such a system might violate the antitrust laws,
and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) refused to grant
antitrust immunity. 4 In 1976, American Airlines and
United Air Lines announced that they would each market
their own systems, SABRE and APOLLO, respectively.
They were followed by Delta (DATAS II), Eastern
(SODA), Northwest and TWA (PARS), and, reluctantly,
Texas Air (System One).' 5 Texas Air merged SODA into
System One when it bought Eastern. APOLLO is now
owned by Covia Partnership, a joint venture of United
and six other airlines.
The three leading CRS's have been quite profitable.
The Department of Transportation estimated that the
three largest systems earn economic rates of return ex-
ceeding 100 percent.' 6 Critics charge that such returns
represent monopoly profits, relying on several facts as ev-
idence of monopolization:' 7
* There are only five systems, and two - Apollo and Sa-
bre - dominate many local markets.
,4 MCSHANE, COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF THEIR IMPACT ON
COMPETITION IN THE UNITED STATES AIRLINE INDUSTRY 5-6 (1987).
I. Pam Fair, Comment, Anti-Competitive Aspects of Airline Ownership of Computerized
Reservation Systems, 17 TRANSP. L.J. 321, 328 (1989).
- U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. DOT-P-37-88-2, STUDY OF AIRLINE COMPUTER RESER-
VATION SYSTEMS (1988) [hereinafter DOT STUDY]. See also Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 397 (1988) [hereinafter House Aviation Subcomm. Hearings].
17 See generally U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., AIRLINE MARKETING PRACTICES: TRAVEL
AGENCIES, FREQUENT-FLYER PROGRAMS, AND COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS 99
(1990); Fair, supra note 15, at 327-36 (discussing the CRS market since deregula-
tion); Dempsey, Empirical Results, supra note 13, at 53; Levine, supra note 4, at 423-
25, 458-64 (discussing unanticipated economic effects of deregulation); Robert L.
Thornton, Airlines and Agents: Conflict and the Public Welfare, 52J. AIR L. & COM. 371,
383 (1986); Derek Saunders, Comment, The Antitrust Implications of Computer Reser-
vation Systems (CRS), 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 172, 180-83 (1985).
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* The costs of developing computer systems and software
pose a barrier to entry because they are probably sunk
costs. 18
* Travel agents and CRS owners sign long-term contracts
that include minimum-use and liquidated-damages
provisions.
* Most travel agents subscribe to only one CRS.
" CRS technology allows the owning airline to overtly or
covertly bias displays and other features so that travel
agents will choose its flights over those of
competitors.' 9
At the same time, CRS's have dramatically lowered air-
line and travel agent costs. One travel agent estimated
that making airline reservations on a CRS takes only one-
third the time it takes to make reservations by looking up
fares in the Official Airline Guide.2 0 A 1981 Harris survey
indicates that CRS raised travel agents' productivity by an
average of forty-one percent. 2 1 Although travel agents re-
tain the option of returning to pre-automation technol-
ogy, ninety-five percent subscribe to at least one CRS.22
In 1984, the CAB acceded to the critics and published a
number of rules for airline-owned CRS's. 3 In addition to
other regulations, the rules prohibit display bias, which is
the practice of listing the CRS-owning airline's flights
first, or otherwise giving them greater prominence on the
computer screen. 4 The CAB also limited to five years the
length of contracts between CRS providers and travel
' Sunk costs are costs that a firm cannot recover if it leaves the industry. These
costs are "the difference between the ex ante opportunity cost and the value that
could be recovered ex post after a commitment to a given project has been
made." WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 37 (1982).
- See Severin Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the
U.S. Airline Industry, 20 RANDJ. ECON. 344, 346-47 (1989).
2 " Note on Airline Reservation Systems, 8 HARV. Bus. SCHOOL CASE STUDY No. 9-
184-009 (1985).
' Martindale, New Reservations About Airline Computers, FREQUENT FLYER, Dec.
1982, at 45-50.
22 DOT STUDY, supra note 16, at 10. See also House Aviation Subcomm. Hearings,
supra note 16, at 1.
2. 14 C.F.R. §§ 255, 256 (1991).
24 14 C.F.R. §§ 255-4, 256.4(b) (1991).
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agents, and it prohibited discriminatory booking fees, tie-
ins, and exclusive-use contracts.25
In March 1991, DOT proposed to renew these rules
and add several others.2 6 As with previous rules, this
most recent Department of Transportation proposal seeks
to stamp out display bias and derivative "unfair" practices
that allegedly prompt travel agents to mislead consumers
into choosing higher-priced flights on CRS-owning
airlines.
WHAT IS CRS DISPLAY BIAS?
The academic and legislative literature on computer-
ized reservation system (CRS) regulation contains several
references to CRS "bias," '27 "prejudice, ' ' 8 and similar
terms implying that CRS owners treat some airlines with
favoritism at the expense of other airlines and, ultimately,
at the expense of consumers. According to the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT), display bias was rampant
in the CRS industry before regulation began in 1984.9
Understanding display bias requires a rudimentary un-
derstanding of how a travel agent views and utilizes infor-
mation displayed on a CRS screen. Suppose a customer
requests that a travel agent book a May 31 flight from
New York to Los Angeles leaving at 10:00 a.m. The agent
feeds this information into a CRS system, which displays
all New York-to-Los Angeles flights leaving New York be-
tween 9:30 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. offered by all airlines that
list on this CRS. Since there will likely be more than one
New York-to-Los Angeles flight offered during this time
period, it is unavoidable that one flight will be listed first,
another second, and so on. If the customer requests that
2.5 14 C.F.R. § 255.6 (1991).
2,1 DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,586.
27 Levine, supra note 4; DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND, supra note 13; Dempsey, Emper-
ical Results, supra note 13; Fair, supra note 15; Saunders, supra note 17; Thornton,
supra note 17; Borenstein, supra note 19; DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at
12,589.
21 DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,589.
2-1 Id.
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the travel agent find not only a flight leaving New York for
Los Angeles at 10:00 a.m. but one that is non-stop, the
search will be narrower. The CRS will then display only
non-stop New York-to-Los Angeles flights leaving be-
tween 9:30 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. Either way, except in the
unlikely event of there being only a single flight generally
satisfying the customer's request, travel agents will find
some flights listed ahead of other flights on a CRS screen.
Thus, nearly all CRS listings inevitably bias some flights at
the expense of others. This unavoidable type of bias is
not what government regulators formally attack as display
bias.
Display bias, in the words of a United States District
Court, "is the practice of displaying flight information in a
way that favors the vendor airline. ' 3 0  Regulators and
CRS critics believe that CRS owners have an incentive to
list their own flights first, thus generating an unfair com-
petitive advantage at the expense of other airlines.1
In our example, display bias occurs if the vendor airline
programs its CRS to list its 10:25 a.m. New York-to-Los
Angeles flight ahead of other airlines' otherwise identical
flights scheduled to leave at times nearer to the cus-
tomer's requested time of 10:00 a.m. Airline-owned ven-
dors have innumerable options for biasing CRS displays
in their favor. In addition to the above example, the ven-
dor may program its CRS to list only those flights of other
airlines that are scheduled to depart within, say, one hour
of the customer's requested departure time, while it lists
.- In re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp.
1443, 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1988). DOT defines display bias somewhat more broadly.
According to DOT, display bias occurs when CRS vendors use factors "directly or
indirectly related to carrier identity in ordering the flights" displayed on CRS
screens summoned by travel agents. DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at
12,609. Strictly speaking, according to this definition, display bias occurs even if
the algorithms that determine the order of a CRS display favor a carrier that does
not own the CRS. However, the DOT and other writers on this subject insist that
display bias inevitably favors the carriers that own CRS's. See DOT Proposed
Rules, supra note 3, at 12,589; Fair, supra note 15; Borenstein, supra note 19; Le-
vine, supra note 4; Thornton, supra note 17; Saunders, supra note 17; Dempsey,
Empirical Results, supra note 13; DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND, supra note 13.
: In re Air Passenger, 694 F. Supp. at 1450.
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all of its own flights scheduled to depart within two hours.
The reader can no doubt imagine other methods available
to create display bias. This is an example of display bias
because the only reason the vendor-airline's flight is listed
first is because it owns the CRS.32 The DOT believes this
bias harms air passengers.3 However, as we argue pres-
ently in this article, no good reason exists to suppose that
consumer-welfare-reducing display bias of any kind will in
fact occur.
Contrary to this prevailing opinion, however, the so-
called "display bias" that emerges in an unregulated mar-
ket can promote, rather than interfere with, the goal of
maximizing consumer welfare. 4 Indeed, there are strong
reasons to believe that display bias will occur in an unreg-
ulated CRS market only if it promotes consumer welfare.
We argue below that display bias that promotes consumer
welfare will occur in a free market. However, if other,
non-biased methods of ordering a CRS display better pro-
mote consumer welfare, these other methods will be used.
For example, if consumers are largely indifferent to car-
rier identity and are extremely price conscious, unregu-
lated CRS vendors have strong incentives to arrange
displays according to price.
Regulators and CRS critics assume without warrant that
biased displays are always and necessarily harmful in com-
parison with other seemingly more neutral displays - i.e,
12 Id. See also Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert, Vertical Integration as a Threat to Compe-
tition: Airline Computer Reservation Systems, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 338-70
(John E. Kwoka & Lawrence White eds., 1989). Guerin-Calvert argues that dis-
play bias occurs when displays are "ordered by using carrier-specific factors as the
means for ranking flights, rather than, say, the best elapsed time or the most con-
venient departure time." Id. at 350.
-' For a more complete statement of the DOT's position, see infra notes 37-38
and accompanying text.
34 "Bias" is a word loaded with negative connotations. If we could, we would
change the name of the type of display ordering likely to emerge on a free market
from "display bias" to something less pejorative. However, "display bias" is now
ensconced as the descriptive name for CRS displays that are ordered according to
carrier identity. Wishing to avoid a debate over semantics, we here stick with the
term "display bias" to describe all CRS orderings that are arranged according to
carrier identity.
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displays not based on carrier identity. The lack of hori-
zontal collusion among CRS vendors, along with low bar-
riers to entry into the travel-agency business, help ensure
that the order of CRS displays - whether biased or not -
will promote rather than diminish consumer welfare.
DO CRS-OWNING AIRLINES HAVE AN UNFAIR
ADVANTAGE?
Complaints about display bias usually assume that bias
must benefit the airline owning the computerized reserva-
tion system (CRS). The Department of Transportation
(DOT) recently expressed the prevailing fear of display
bias:
Before the [now-defunct] Civil Aeronautics Board
adopted the CRS rules ... each vendor biased its displays
of airline services to improve the display position of its
own flights and to worsen (and sometimes eliminate) the
display of its competitors' flights. This shifted traffic away
from their competitors to the vendors, thereby reducing
or eliminating the profitability of competing flights oper-
ated by non-vendors. The bias thus handicapped airlines
in competing on the basis of service and fares, for consum-
ers and their agents often would not learn which airline
provided the best service for them. 5
DOT here describes a case of market failure; it argues, in
effect, that market forces are insufficient to keep the
profit-maximizing efforts of airline-owned CRS vendors
confined to those activities that promote consumer wel-
fare. DOT believes the CRS market failed prior to
regulation:
Because travel agents are busy, they usually booked a
flight from the first screen of the display and often booked
the first flight displayed. The vendors used display bias to
improve the position of their flights in the display,
whether or not their flights best met the traveller's sched-
ule and fare requirements.
As a result, travel agents often booked' consumers on
DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,589.
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less suitable flights because the best flight was in a lower
position on the first screen or on a later screen.36
However, DOT's argument collapses under scrutiny.
First, it is at least questionable that travel agents who,
according to DOT, operate in a "highly competitive" in-
dustry37 will not glance to the bottom of their screens or
scroll to a second, third, or fourth screen in order to find
the flights that their customers most desire. Customers of
firms operating in a competitive industry can easily switch
from one firm to another until they find the firm charging
the lowest possible price and offering the best available
package of services. If flights with lower air fares are
listed later in the CRS display, travel agents who consist-
ently take the few seconds required to find these more de-
sirable flights will take business away from agents who fail
to check for more suitable flights. The only reason such
searches by travel agents will not occur is if the typical
customer values the thirty seconds or so of his time more
than the amount of money he could save through a more
extensive search.3 8 This will occur if the fare differences
between listed flights are typically small which suggests
that the airline industry is competitive, or if the amount of
time required to search the entire CRS display is relatively
large. The first of these possibilities seems likely; the sec-
ond does not. It may, however, be too costly for travel
agents to search CRS displays for flights more suited to
their customers' demands. No detailed data exists to re-
fute this possibility. Therefore, this paper concedes the
assumption made in virtually all the literature on CRS
regulation, namely, that the costs of display searches by
travel agents are significant.
Nevertheless, even if flights listed first in a CRS display
always enjoy an advantage over flights listed further down
I d. at 12,608.
.7 Id. at 12,609.
-is Only uncovering lower air fares is discussed here; however, the point is more
general. A travel agent who looks past the first listed flight may not find only
lower fares, but better flight times or other non-price amenities that are valued by
the customer.
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on the display, airline-owned vendors will not have suffi-
cient incentives to give their own flights priority listing
unless such a listing maximizes the value of the CRS to
travel agencies and their customers.39 To the extent that
being listed first conveys any advantages, it promotes
whatever airline that happens to be listed first. However,
it is likely that the premier listing on a display for any
given route is more valuable to some airlines than to
others, because such a listing may raise some airlines' rev-
enues more than others'. For example, United's profits
per booking for flights to and from Atlanta may increase
by two dollars if its flights move up in the display to pre-
mier listing, whereas Delta's profits per booking may in-
crease by three dollars for a similar move. Delta will likely
outbid United for the premier display listing for these
flights .40
Thus, the CRS vendor can charge a premium for these
advantageous slots. If a CRS-owning airline biases its
CRS to favor itself, any extra revenues that result are not
free. A vendor that lists its own flights in the advantaged
slots forgoes the premium other airlines would have paid
for these slots. As long as airlines and CRS systems are
permitted to bargain with each other, the airlines that
value these positions most highly will get them regardless
of who owns the CRS.
In other words, the Coase Theorem should work in
the CRS industry. The Coase Theorem implies that the
legal right to take an action does not necessarily translate
into an economic motivation to take that action. Legally
recognized and enforced rights are distinct from econom-
49 For reasons why a travel agency might demand that its CRS vendor list the
flights of a certain airline ahead of others, see infra notes 47-49 and accompanying
text.
40 It is unlikely that a single airline will attach the highest value to being listed
first in all displays for all routes in a CRS's data base. It is much more likely, for
example, that Delta, with a hub in Atlanta, is willing to pay more than any other
airline to be listed first on displays showing flights to Atlanta, while United is
willing to offer top dollar for premier listing on displays showing flights to Wash-
ington's Dulles airport, where United has a hub.
41 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
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ically rational exercises of these rights. If the owner of a
right is free to sell it, whoever values the right most highly
will buy it.
Consider an example. Suppose a listing airline that
does not own a CRS has a hub in New Orleans and being
listed first on a CRS display of flights to and from New
Orleans is worth five dollars per passenger more to this
airline than to any other airlines. This New Orleans-
based airline will find it rational to offer up to five dollars
more per booking to be listed first on displays showing
flights to and from New Orleans. If an airline owner of a
CRS insists on listing its own New Orleans flights first
rather than those of the carrier with a hub in New Orle-
ans, the vendor airline forgoes the extra five dollars per
booking it could receive if it sells the premier list position
to the New Orleans-based carrier. No profit-maximizing
airline will continue to list itself first even on its own CRS
if another carrier is willing and able to pay more for the
premier listing than it is worth to the CRS owner. In
short, display bias will occur only when the airline that
owns a CRS happens to value the premier slot in a display
more than does any other airline serving the route indi-
cated by this display. In an unregulated market, CRS list-
ing slots are not allocated arbitrarily according to the
whims of CRS owners. They are allocated according to
their market values regardless of who owns the CRS's.1
2
Note that no one has presented strong evidence to
show that the CRS industry is monopolized or that its
members collude with each other. As a matter of fact, ad-
vantageous display slots in a CRS will be allocated to their
most highly valued users even if the CRS industry is mo-
42 See, e.g., Airline Reservation Systems: Curse of the Mummy's Tomb, REGULATION,
Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 8, 8-9, 55-56: "The most obvious way for a carrier to bid for
better screen position, of course, is to offer a higher fee to the system operator."
Id. at 55. In addition, some real-world evidence exists to support our claim that
CRS vendors will voluntarily sell privileged slots in displays to airlines. Prior to
the 1984 C.A.B. regulation of CRS's, "some airlines paid additional fees for en-
hancements, such as boarding passes and preferential listings in the display."
Guerin-Calvert, supra note 32, at 342.
5791992]
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nopolized. A monopoly CRS vendor, no less than a com-
petitive vendor, maximizes its profits by selling
advantageous slots to airlines that value these slots most
highly. If the airline owner of a monopoly CRS vendor
values the first listing slot more than any other airline, it
will keep the first listing for itself. If another airline values
this listing more highly, a profit-maximizing monopoly
vendor will grab the higher revenues available by selling
the listing to that airline. Consequently, display bias is no
more likely if the CRS industry is monopolized than if it is
competitive.
THE MONOPOLY LEVERAGING ARGUMENT
One prominent response to the above argument is that
a CRS-owning airline can use the CRS as a lever to secure
monopoly power over certain routes. As the Department
of Transportation (DOT) argues, the "concept of monop-
oly leveraging is applicable to the CRS's, since each ven-
dor has the power and incentive to use its control of a
system to unfairly prejudice the competitive position of its
airline rivals."43 For example, suppose American Airlines
(a CRS owner) faces vigorous competition from America
West (which does not own a CRS) on its Wichita-to-Phoe-
nix flights. Assume additionally that America West would
earn six dollars of additional revenue per booking if it
were listed first in American's Sabre CRS displays show-
ing flights from Wichita to Phoenix while American would
earn only an additional two dollars per booking. America
West would be willing to pay up to six dollars per booking
for the premier listing and American would be willing to
sell this privilege to America West. In a freely functioning
market, America West would get prime listing before
American.
But, according to the theory of monopoly leveraging,
American might deny America West the premier display
4:1 DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,602; cf id. at 12,589 (noting that
vendors control the flow of information between the airline and their primary dis-
tibutor channel, travel agencies).
COMPUTERIZED RESER VA TIONS
slot in an effort to gain for itself a monopoly over the
Wichita-to-Phoenix route. As long as the current compet-
itive situation persists, the additional revenues available
to American from being listed first in the display are less
than those available to America West. However, the pros-
pect of earning monopoly profits on this route may make
it worthwhile for American to refuse the six dollars per
booking offered by America West. Suppose that by listing
itself in the premier slot, American eventually secures a
monopoly on the Wichita-to-Phoenix route. American
will list itself first if the net present value of the monopoly
profits it expects to gain exceeds the extra amount it
would earn by selling the premier listing position to
America West. In this way, American's CRS ownership
could theoretically be used to harm competition in the air-
line industry.
It would be a mistake, though, to leap from this theoret-
ical possibility to practical policy conclusions. The lever-
aging argument overlooks a simple but significant fact:
the expected monopoly profits may not exceed the value
of the revenues earned by selling the premier listing to
another airline. In addition, several more subtle weak-
nesses plague the leveraging theory. First, the theory too
cavalierly assumes that airlines have no effective alterna-
tives to listing on CRS's. Second, it ignores the fact that
CRS vendors compete amongst themselves for the pa-
tronage of travel agencies. Finally, it overlooks the air-
lines' ability to purchase preferential listings from the
CRS owner. Consider each weakness in turn.
Alternatives to CRS
Listing on, and booking through, a CRS is only one of
the means available to an airline to market its tickets. An
airline can offer to sell tickets directly to the public by
conducting advertising campaigns which reach consumers
directly and prompt consumers to contact the airline,
rather than a travel agent, for flight information and
booking services. If a vendor tries to promote the flights
5811992]
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of one airline at the expense of other listed airlines, those
airlines disadvantaged by these actions can withdraw from
this vendor's system and begin marketing their own tick-
ets more extensively. Note also that the attractiveness of
this CRS to travel agencies will decrease as airlines pull
out, making it less important for any airline to list on that
particular CRS. Because of this possibility, travel agen-
cies can be expected to protect themselves against devalu-
ation of the CRS to which each subscribes by insisting on
contract terms that restrict the ability of vendors to arbi-
trarily grant display favors to one airline at the expense of
other airlines. In addition, nothing prevents airlines
themselves from insisting on contract terms with CRS
vendors that protect airlines from arbitrary display bias.
CRS Competition
The monopoly leveraging theory also ignores the abil-
ity of carriers who do not own a CRS system to use other
CRS vendors to compete with attempted monopolization
of particular air-passenger routes. Vendors compete
amongst themselves for patronage by travel agencies.
Just as a travel agency is unlikely to sign a contract al-
lowing the vendor to charge higher prices than those
charged by another vendor offering similar services, few
travel agencies will subscribe to a vendor who uses display
criteria preventing agencies from securing the most desir-
able flights and fares for customers.
To assert the contrary is to assume that travel agents
are systematically inept business people or that entry into
the travel-agency business is seriously impeded. This is a
subtle point that was lost on the DOT and others. In pre-
vious work, one of the authors of this article suggested
that, although alleged market power does not justify CRS
regulation, display bias may give rise to fraud because
consumers do not know which CRS system the travel
agent uses and thus they have a hard time preventing
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bias.44 This argument ignores two facts: (1) consumers
can easily shop among travel agencies, many of which sub-
scribe to different CRS's, for lower-priced fares or better
flights, and (2) existing agents who defraud consumers
make entrance into the travel-agency business easier. For
example, even if all current travel agents possess espe-
cially poor business skills or low ethical standards, low
barriers to entry into the travel-agency business ensure
that new agents will enter the market if profit opportuni-
ties exist.45
Furthermore, anti-consumer display bias creates profit
opportunities for new travel agents who will insist on con-
tract terms prohibiting vendors from sequencing their dis-
plays in ways that prevent these new agents from
providing better service to consumers. Consumers will
shift from those agencies that allow vendors to bias their
displays in ways that harm consumers to those agencies
that do not allow harmful bias. Again, unless DOT can
show that vendors are successfully colluding or that travel
agencies operate in a market with high barriers to entry,
the observed pattern of data sequencing provided by ven-
dors is likely to promote consumer welfare.46
44 See Jerome Ellig, Computer Reservation Systems, Creative Destruction, and Consumer
Welfare: Some Unsettled Issues, 19 TRANSP. L. J. 287, 303 (1991).
4. The authors are not aware of anyone arguing that the travel-agency industry
is marred by high entry barriers. Such an argument would be entirely unbeliev-
able. Although the authors have no data on the typical dollar amount of capital
required to run a successful travel agency, this amount is probably quite low.
Travel agencies require only modest amounts of office space and office furniture,
no expensive equipment, and labor which does not require long periods of spe-
cialized training. Perhaps the most expensive single investment for a travel
agency is the computer hardware, but computers are no longer expensive items.
Even if they were, investments in computers are not sunk costs because computers
can easily be used in, or sold to, other businesses. Terminals and other specific
CRS equipment may represent sunk costs for CRS vendors, but they are not for
travel agents because travel agents can lease the equipment from vendors. Invest-
ments that are not sunk costs pose no entry barrier. See SHARKEY, supra note 18, at
146, 151-57.
4,i For reasons why data-sequencing patterns that appear to the outside ob-
server to be biased against consumers might, in fact, contribute to consumer wel-
fare, see infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
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Market for CRS Slots
Finally, the leveraging theory overlooks the fact that a
monopoly is worth something to carriers that do not own
the CRS; there is no reason to assume A PRIORI that suc-
cessful monopolization of an air-passenger route is worth
more to an airline that owns a CRS than to an airline that
does not own a CRS. Return to the American Airlines/
America West example. Those who would argue that
American Airlines' ownership of a CRS gives American an
advantage at monopolizing the Wichita-Phoenix route im-
plicitly assume that this monopoly is worth less to
America West than it is to American. But this assumption
is unwarranted.
American's ownership of a CRS is an insufficient reason
to believe that American will profit more than another air-
line from successful monopolization of this route. If
America West expects to reap higher monopoly returns
from successful monopolization of this route than does
American, perhaps because America West is expanding its
hub in Phoenix, and if such monopolization requires be-
ing listed in the premier slot on CRS displays, America
West will offer to pay American's CRS more for the privi-
lege of being listed first than American itself is willing to
pay.47 Again, the identity of the owner of a CRS plays no
part in determining which airlines are listed first on CRS
displays and which are not. This is true even if we assume
that the premier slot on a CRS display is a ticket to mo-
nopolization of a particular air-passenger routes.
Ironically, regulations that prohibit CRS vendors from
charging discriminatory fees may actually encourage a
CRS-owning airline to bias displays against competitors.
If all airlines must pay the same fees, they cannot bid
against each other for the premier listing. An airline-
owned CRS that receives equal booking fees from all air-
47 That is, America West will offer to pay an amount for the premier listing that
is higher than the value that American attaches to putting its own flights in this
premier slot.
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lines may then find it most profitable to consistently favor
its own flights. If airlines could bid for the premier slots,
this type of bias would likely diminish, because CRS sys-
tems could make higher profits by selling the premier
slots to the highest bidder.
DISPLAY BIAS: CONSUMERS' FRIEND OR FOE?
So far this paper has established that, in an unregulated
market, airlines owning computerized reservation systems
(CRS) maximize profits by selling each display slot to the
highest bidder. A CRS-owning airline will bias displays in
its favor only if it values the premier slots more highly
than do other airlines. This fact does not mean that dis-
play bias will not occur, only that observed bias is not a
function of which airlines own the CRS. Displays may
well be arranged according to carrier identity, even if the
carriers favored by the displays are not always or even typ-
ically the carriers that own CRS's.
Why might some airlines value being listed first in a dis-
play more than do other airlines? Further, does observed
display bias, even if it does not generally favor airline-
owners of CRS's, promote or impede consumer welfare?
According to Federal Trade Commission economist An-
drew Kleit, 48 the value that airlines place on display pref-
erence derives from three sources. These sources
promote only those forms and amounts of bias that in-
crease the welfare of consumers of airlines' services:
First, display preference may reduce the cost to consumers
of searching for their preferred supplier. Second, the will-
ingness of a firm to purchase display preference may pro-
vide a signal of product quality. Third, a preferred display
position may increase customer brand awareness for new
or relatively unknown suppliers.49
Each of these arguments will be considered in turn.
4s Andrew Kleit, Computer Reservation Systems: Competition Misunderstood
(April 1991) (unpublished draft, forthcoming in ANTITRUST BULL.).
49 Id. at 15.
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Reduced Search Costs
If consumers flying to or from Atlanta have a suffi-
ciently strong preference for Delta Airlines over other air-
lines, CRS vendors may have an incentive, depending on
the strength of this consumer preference, to list Delta first
on displays showing Atlanta flights. This occurs because
travel agents will prefer to subscribe to CRS's listing Delta
flights first on these displays. Such a bias saves time and
money because consumers would have requested Delta
flights more frequently anyway. 50 Assuming consumer
preference for Delta flights in this geographic region to
be very strong, a CRS refusing to list Delta first on these
displays would lose travel-agency subscribers to other
CRS's that do list Delta first.5' Hence, display bias in
favor of Delta emerges for flights to and from Atlanta.
The bias, however, is solely a response to consumer pref-
erences. It is not a function of the CRS owner's identity,
nor does it in any way suggest monopolization of the CRS
industry or of any segment of the air-passenger market. It
is simply an efficient market response to consumer
desires.
Signaling
An airline's purchase of the premier display slot may be
an efficient way to signal travel agencies and air passen-
gers that this airline intends to improve its service or to
maintain its already high level of service. In this sense,
display bias serves much the same purpose as celebrity en-
dorsements or lavish commercials featuring consumer
- Note that, in this circumstance, Delta probably need not pay a premium to be
listed first. Consumer preference for Delta here may be sufficient to cause CRS
vendors to list Delta flights first.
.1 Of course, consumer preference for Delta flights does not guarantee that
Delta flights will be listed first. Other economic considerations may overwhelm
this particular consumer preference, thereby causing some other airline's flights
to be listed ahead of Delta. For example, even with some consumer preference
for Delta flights, Continental may offer to purchase prime listing on a CRS's dis-
play at a price more than sufficient to cover the cost the CRS vendor incurs in the
form of heightened risk that some travel agencies will switch to other CRS ven-
dors that list Delta flights first.
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products which cost firms that advertise substantial sums
of money. To the extent being listed first in a display is
valuable to airlines, market participants, particularly travel
agents, are aware that any airline whose flights enjoy
prime listing had to pay for such a listing. An airline that
has no intention of delivering on its product-quality
promises simply cannot afford to pay as high a price for
prime display slots as can those airlines that plan to de-
liver the type of service they promise.5 2 Consumers obvi-
ously benefit from such signaling by airlines.
Facilitating New Entry
Finally, being listed first in a CRS display may be part of
the optimal marketing mix for an airline attempting to get
a share in a new market. In markets served by airlines
with high name recognition among air passengers, a new
entrant is at a disadvantage because the entrant must in-
cur entry costs that are no longer required of the incum-
bents.5" Entry costs can take innumerable forms.
Examples of these costs include promotional air fares
lower than fares charged by incumbents or the need to
spend more on television and newspaper advertising than
established airlines must spend.54 To the extent that be-
ing listed first in a CRS display confers an advantage on a
carrier, purchasing the top position in a display is another
possible way for a new entrant to compete more effec-
tively with established incumbents. Of course, because
52 The classic statement of this principle is Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler,
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615,
629-33 (1981).
- See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY, 67-70 (1968); Le-
vine, supra note 4, at 425-32.
5-4 Economists regard advertising as a highly effective way for new entrants into
markets to attract customers away from incumbent firms and to make these mar-
kets more competitive. The literature on the economics of advertising is vast. See,
e.g., ROBERT B. EKELUND AND DAVID S. SAURMAN, ADVERTISING AND THE MARKET
PROCESS (1988) (rejecting the traditional theory that advertising decreases com-
petition); ISRAEL KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973); Lee Ben-
ham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 337, 352
(1972) (showing empirically that the price of eyeglasses is lower in states that al-
low the advertising of eyeglasses than in states that prohibit such advertising).
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consumers benefit from the increased competition made
possible by new entry, this display bias benefits
consumers.
FEES AND LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
The argument developed in this article thus far assumes
that a lack of collusion among computerized reservation
system (CRS) vendors, along with competition and low
entry barriers in the travel-agency business 5 5 is sufficient
to generate competitive outcomes in the CRS industry.
However, much of Department of Transportation's
(DOT) argument in support of continued regulation of
the CRS industry rests on its belief that (1) each CRS is a
monopolist and, (2) long-term contracts between CRS
vendors and travel agencies effectively undermine com-
petitive forces.
According to the DOT, because the typical travel
agency subscribes to only one CRS, "each airline must
participate in all of the systems"' 56 to get its fair share of
bookings. The monopoly power that results from each
airline's need to participate in all CRS's supposedly allows
each vendor to charge monopoly prices to subscriber air-
lines without losing its airline customers. This argument
ignores some fundamental economic facts about the
travel-agency business.
If a CRS vendor increases the booking fees it charges to
an airline, the airline will decrease by an equivalent
amount the commission it pays to travel agents who use
the now higher-priced CRS. As airline commission pay-
ments to travel agents decrease, the profitability to the
agents of using the CRS that charges comparatively high
booking fees falls relative to that of using CRS's that
charge lower booking fees. The CRS that raises its book-
ing fees above the competitive level will, therefore, be
forced to lower its booking fees or be replaced by CRS's
-. See supra note 48 for reasons why the travel-agency business is characterized
by low barriers to entry.
DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,589.
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that charge competitive fees.57 Travel agencies' ability to
switch CRS vendors keeps them competitive.
The counterargument is that long-term contracts be-
tween CRS vendors and travel agencies effectively sus-
pend this competitive process. According to the DOT,
"most travel agencies are limited to contracts that dis-
courage them from switching to a new system or adding a
new system."'5 8 This argument is unconvincing for several
reasons. First, travel agencies have every incentive to
avoid any contractual commitments that allow CRS's to
exploit them. Each travel agency surely knows that the
longer the term of the contract it signs with a CRS ven-
dor, the greater the danger that the agency will be obliged
to forego switching to a competing vendor who offers su-
perior terms. No reason exists for a profit-seeking busi-
ness owner or manager not to consider the cost of the
inability to switch to another CRS when he or she calcu-
lates all of the expected costs and benefits of agreeing to a
long-term contract with a vendor.
Second, during the term of the contract, a travel agency
can protect itself from possible fee increases above the
competitive level by demanding contractual provisions
covering such a contingency. Such provisions would insu-
late the agency from the ill effects of fee increases, includ-
ing possible reductions in commissions received from
airlines and any loss of business to agencies who sub-
scribe to CRS and charge lower booking fees. If monopo-
listic behavior by vendors was a genuine problem during
the contractual period, it is plausible that each agency
would demand provisions restricting its vendor's ability to
increase booking fees. Vendors who refuse to submit to
such restrictions would lose travel agency subscriptions to
vendors who contractually agree to limit their abilities to
increase booking fees.
Thus, unless and until vendors successfully collude with
each other, the argument that vendor monopoly power
5,7 See Kleit, supra note 48, at 10-11.
r," DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,589.
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flows from the long-term contracts between vendors and
travel agencies is implausible. But why does the typical
travel agency subscribe to only one vendor? The answer
must be that the costs to an agency of having multiple
CRS's outweigh the benefits. These costs include the ex-
pense of training agents on multiple systems, the costs
and inconvenience of having additional hardware taking
up space in the agency's offices, and the possible expense
of paying subscription fees to more than one CRS. On
the other hand, subscribing to multiple CRS's would al-
low an agent the option of choosing a second CRS if the
first CRS charges higher fees, has undesirable display
bias, or is otherwise less attractive than a second CRS. An
agency will subscribe to multiple CRS's only if these bene-
fits outweigh the costs. However, if CRS vendors in fact
behave competitively, the benefits of subscribing to multi-
ple CRS's will be negligible because all CRS's will offer
competitive packages to subscribing travel agencies.
Thus, the costs of multiple subscriptions quite likely will
outweigh the benefits. The observed phenomenon of sin-
gle subscriptions by travel agencies is consistent with the
argument that CRS vendors behave competitively.
In response critics charge that the fact that each agency
typically subscribes to only one CRS is evidence of the re-
strictive contracting provisions insisted on by CRS ven-
dors, rather than of the efficiency of subscribing to a
single vendor. This argument is without merit absent col-
lusion between CRS vendors. Competition among ven-
dors for travel agency subscriptions ensures competitive
contractual terms.
Non-colluding vendors will compete for the patronage
of agencies seeking CRS service. Lack of collusion
obliges each CRS vendor to compete for travel agency
subscribers by offering agencies the best possible terms
available. If a CRS vendor offers non-competitive terms
to a travel agency, another vendor will find it profitable to
offer competitive terms to that agency in order to secure
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that agency's business. And, as argued earlier,59 no ra-
tional reason exists to presume that the typical owner or
manager of a travel agency is so inept as to sign a long-
term contract with a vendor if other vendors are offering,
or will likely offer, better terms. The competition among
CRS vendors for long-term contractual relations with
travel agencies is competition for the market, rather than
competition within the market. As Harold Demsetz has
shown, this type of competition generates competitive re-
sults. 60 When vendors compete for travel agency sub-
scriptions, the terms in the typical agency-vendor contract
most likely stem from efficiency, not monopoly.
Consequently, the fact that the typical travel agency
subscribes to a single CRS in no way implies that each
CRS exercises monopoly power over its subscribing agen-
cies. Competition among CRS vendors for contractual re-
lations with travel agencies assures that the emergent
contractual provisions are fair to travel agencies. Since
travel agencies are, in the words of DOT, "highly compet-
itive,"' 61 any contractual advantages secured by travel
agencies can be expected to flow through to consumers.
Since the DOT presents no evidence suggesting collu-
sion among vendors, much of the language it uses to de-
scribe vendor-agency contracts is inappropriate. For
example, the DOT asserts that "vendors impose various
contractual requirements on their subscribers to prevent
them from switching to another system."' 62 But, in fact,
nothing is "imposed" on anyone. Contracts are voluntary
agreements among two or more parties.6' Each party
promises to subject itself to conditions desired by the
other party in return for the other party's promise to sub-
-1 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & EcON. 55 (1968).
DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,609.
Id. at 12,594-95.
To be enforceable at law, a contract must be the result of a mutual assent and
a meeting of the minds between bargaining parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, §§ 17, 20 (1979).
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ject itself to conditions desired by the first party.64 DOT's
language improperly suggests that vendors unilaterally
select the terms of the contracts entered into with travel
agents. However, the ability of each agent to choose the
vendor to which it will subscribe, because there is no col-
lusion among CRS vendors, and to switch vendors when
its contract expires, suggests that the contractual agree-
ments between vendors and agents are the result of com-
petitive bargaining rather than the result of a unilateral
exercise of monopoly power by vendors. 65 The DOT falls
into the trap of circular reasoning. It accuses vendors of
gaining monopoly power through the restrictive contracts
signed with agencies and then suggests that the only rea-
son agents sign these contracts is because vendors have
monopoly power. Until someone presents persuasive evi-
dence that CRS vendors consistently and successfully col-
lude with each other, observed contract terms must be
presumed to be optimal for both vendors and agents.
WHAT IF COMPETITION IS NOT "PERFECT"?
Even if computerized reservation system (CRS) compe-
tition is not perfect and CRS vendors earn seemingly high
profits, that does not necessarily mean that regulation will
benefit consumers. Instead, regulation could harm con-
sumers by sending industry a strong message that innova-
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 1 (1979), defines a contract as "a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." Id. Section 2, in
turn, defines a promise as "a manifestation of intention to act or to refrain from
acting in a specified way, so as to justify a promisee in understanding that a com-
mitment has been made." Id. § 2. Section 17 lists the requirement that contracts
be built on "a bargain in which there is manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange and consideration." Id. § 17. Finally, according to § 71, "considera-
tion" may consist of a bargained-for performance which, in turn, "(3) ... may
consist of (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation,
modification, or destruction of a legal relation." Id. § 71. See also E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS (1982). Farnsworth notes that contract law is "concerned with ex-
changes that relate to the future because a 'promise' is a commitment by a person
as to his future behavior." Id. § 1.1, at 4 (emphasis in original).
-, See DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3 at 12,589-90.
COMPUTERIZED RESER VA TIONS
tion does not pay.66
The CRS is such a dramatic innovation in the airline
industry that few travel agents are willing to do without
them. CRS helps airlines, travel agents, and the flying
public in many ways. For example, travel agents have
lower costs, and passengers get lower fares. If CRS raised
costs or fares above what they would be in the absence of
CRS, travel agents would have an incentive to revert to
pre-CRS technologies. Despite allegations of abuses, it is
simply irrational now for travel agents to return to the Of-
ficial Airline Guide and to processing ticket orders by
hand.
Despite the immense improvements CRS's brought to
the industry, the DOT has not applauded the innovative
airlines that developed CRS. Instead, after the innovation
was put into practice and proven successful, the DOT de-
clared CRS's to be "essential facilities ' 67 and sought to
lower CRS profits through regulation. This approach
stands in direct contrast to the way this nation normally
treats innovation. Customarily, public policy has acknowl-
edged that if innovation is to occur, innovators must be
able to appropriate the profits from their innovations.68
In condemning restrictive CRS practices, the DOT ig-
nores the fact that innovative firms frequently require an
assortment of restrictive practices which allow them to
reap the rewards from their innovations. In economistJo-
seph Schumpeter's classic statement,
[S]uch concerns are aggressors by nature and wield the re-
ally effective weapon of competition. Their intrusion can
only in the rarest of cases fail to improve total output in
quantity or quality, both through the new method itself -
even if at no time used to full advantage - and through
This section draws heavily on Ellig, supra note 44.
DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,602.
For surveys of economics literature that include discussions of this problem,
see Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies ofInnovation and Market
Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, (Richard Schmalensee and
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Giovanni Dosi, Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic
Effects of Innovation, 26J. EcON. LIT. 1120 (1988).
1992] 593
594 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
the pressure it exerts on the preexisting firms. But these
aggressors are so circumstanced as to require, for pur-
poses of attack and defense, also pieces of armor other
than price and quality of their produce which, moreover,
must be strategically manipulated all along so that at any
point in time they seem to be doing nothing but restricting
their output and keeping prices high.69
Consumers could easily benefit from the seemingly re-
strictive practices of CRS operators since the resulting
profits are the prize that induced the innovation in the
first place. If the airlines had known that display bias
would be prohibited, that contract lengths would be lim-
ited, and that other contractual terms would be restricted,
it is possible that the systems would not have been devel-
oped. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals even sug-
gested in 1985 that
[m]aybe [biasing of computerized reservation systems] can
be defended as a method by which airlines that spent hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to develop computerized res-
ervation systems, at considerable risk of failure, can
recoup their investment with a profit commensurate with
the amount of investment, the length of time it has been
outstanding, and the risk of loss. 70
Regulators recognized from the beginning that CRS's
may involve significant sunk costs. The DOT notes, for
example, that
the [Civil Aeronautics] Board found a number of very high
barriers to new entry or to expansion by existing vendors.
The barriers included high capital costs, much of which
were 'sunk,' i.e., not recoverable by an entrant upon exit
from the market as well as the long time required for de-
velopment of a competitive product. 7'
Unfortunately, regulators have viewed the sunk costs only
""JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 89 (3d ed.
1950).
-, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1113 (7th Cir.
1985) (Posner, J.).
7 DOT Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 12,592.
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as a rationale for regulation and not as a potential reason
for CRS developers to be enticed into the industry by the
prospect of large profits.
CRS technology obviously will not disappear at the first
hint of regulation. But restricting the profitability of this
innovation after it is in place is analogous to confiscating a
farmer's crops after they are harvested or leaving a restau-
rant after dinner without paying the bill. Airlines that do
not own a CRS may reap short-term gains, but only by
diminishing incentives for enterprise, ingenuity, and hard
work in the future.
Tighter regulation of computer reservation systems
would penalize the leading firms for being the first to rec-
ognize and develop the tremendous potential of their in-
formation-processing technology. As a result, regulation
would discourage further innovation in the CRS industry.
Innovation elsewhere in the economy might even be sti-
fled if entrepreneurs in general assume that they too
might have to forfeit their innovation-induced profits. 2
As the global economy enters the information age, it
would indeed be unfortunate if the DOT started penaliz-
ing American firms for launching dramatic innovations in
information management. In short, the effects of existing
and proposed CRS regulations could reach far beyond the
airline ticket/travel agent marketplace. They set a prece-
dent for the general treatment of innovation and it is a
precedent that could discourage new discoveries in infor-
mation technology fields.
CONCLUSION
The rationale for computerized reservation system
(CRS) regulation emerged because regulators and theo-
rists adopted a view of consumer welfare which is too nar-
row. If the economic models of perfect competition 73 or
72 KIRZNER, supra note 12; ISRAEL KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEUR-
sHiP (1973).
7 For definitions of perfect competition and policy implications see SCHERER,
supra note 8, at 5-6; WATERSON, supra note 8, at 11.
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perfect contestability 4 are used as a policy norm, there is
little choice but to regard display bias, long-term con-
tracts, sunk costs, and high profits as signals of monopoly.
In the rarified theoretical worlds described by these mod-
els, individuals possess full relevant knowledge, resources
are perfectly mobile, and abnormal profits are instantly
competed away. As a result, the CRS industry's unusual
business practices have little explanation other than as de-
vices to attain and maintain monopoly. 5
The theoretical economic models, however, do not
completely describe reality. Imperfect information means
that display bias can perform a useful function by reduc-
ing search costs or signaling product quality. An uncer-
tain future makes long-term contracts desirable to protect
sunk investments. Ignorance of production possibilities
implies that large profits are available to entrepreneurs
who can see and implement more efficient technologies.
In short, the practices and circumstances that seem to
provide a rationale for regulation are actually means of
solving the problems created when the real world departs
from the assumptions of the economic models of perfect
markets.76
Viewed in this light, the split on the CRS issue among
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members of the coalition supporting airline deregulation
makes sense. Economists and policymakers who thought
deregulation would bring the industry closer to perfect
competition or contestability naturally suspect that air-
line-owned CRS's could subvert this goal. On the other
hand, those who saw deregulation as a means of un-
leashing entrepreneurial innovation view CRS business
practices as a natural and desirable result of the competi-
tive process.

